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eXeCutive summary
The remarkable growth of informal migrant entrepreneurship in South Africa since 1990 would have been much lauded had it not been for 
the striking detail that the actors in question are seen as “foreigners” or 
“outsiders”. As such, they are uniformly viewed as undesirable and disad-
vantaging poor South African citizens. The growing presence of migrants in 
the informal sector has created various tensions in South Africa, including 
in government circles, ignoring the fact that in the free market economy of 
South Africa, immigrants and refugees, like citizens and commercial enter-
prises, would otherwise enjoy the freedom to establish, operate and expand 
their businesses.
The xenophobic anti-immigrant violence that swept South Africa in May 
2008 led to the deaths of over 70 people, seriously injured 400 and displaced 
as many as 100,000 from their communities. A large number of migrant-
owned businesses were also destroyed in the mayhem. Looting, burning and 
destruction of business property was widespread and many migrant entre-
preneurs were among those hounded out of their communities. 
Such actions did not stop after May 2008, however. If anything, they 
have become more insidious and pervasive. 
South Africa provides an important case study of how citizen attitudes 
and behaviours materially affect the business climate for migrant entrepre-
neurs. Trying to run a business in the informal economy is an especially 
hazardous undertaking in South Africa. First, the state (both central and 
municipal) has adopted a protectionist position, which leads to various 
regulatory and policing responses that seek to disadvantage, if not eliminate, 
migrant entrepreneurship. Second, the police run their own protection (or 
non-harassment) rackets to benefit financially from those able to pay. Third, 
South African competitors, particularly in the spaza sector, have increas-
ingly adopted a strategy of using violence to intimidate and drive migrant 
entrepreneurs out of an area. And fourth, a minority of citizens have turned 
hostile attitudes towards migrants and refugees into violent actions by for-
cibly shutting down migrant-owned businesses and attacking their owners 
and employees. Underlying all of these responses is a strong xenophobic 
undertow.
National attitudinal surveys by SAMP, as well as in-depth qualitative 
research and the personal testimony of many migrants, confirm that many 
South Africans hold deep-rooted negative opinions about migrants and 
migrant entrepreneurs. In the face of this body of evidence, claims by promi-
nent political figures that xenophobia does not exist in South Africa ring 
extremely hollow. South Africans make clear distinctions between African 
migrants of different nationalities, with migrants from countries including 
Somalia and Zimbabwe viewed far less favourably than those from Bot-
swana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Since many informal migrant entrepreneurs 
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are from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Somalia and the DRC, they are singled 
out for harsh treatment. 
SAMP asked South Africans how likely they would be to take part in col-
lective action against the presence of migrants and found 25% were likely to 
prevent a migrant from operating a business in their area. The survey results 
revealed that around one in every ten South Africans was predisposed to 
turn hostile attitudes into violent actions. This may seem a relatively low 
proportion in light of the prevalence of negative attitudes but multiplied it 
suggests that 3.8 million (out of an adult population of around 35 million) 
South Africans would be prepared to use violent means to rid their neigh-
bourhoods of foreign migrants. 
Looting and vandalism of migrant-owned shops have been especially 
common features of collective violence over the past several years. Some 
of this violence is obviously motivated primarily by criminality, especially 
robberies and looting, but to attribute all attacks to criminal motivation is 
reductionist and misleading. In general, the weak structural and social posi-
tion of “foreigners” in localized areas as “outsiders”, combined with limited 
access to protection and justice, makes them more vulnerable to criminal 
attack. Acts of collective violence include (a) written or verbal threats 
and insults directed at migrant entrepreneurs; (b) public intimidation of 
migrant entrepreneurs through protests or marches or other similar collec-
tive actions; (c) involuntary migrant shop closures; (d) direct physical vio-
lence against migrant store owners or their employees; (e) looting of store 
contents; (f) damage to the physical structure of shops, especially through 
arson; (g) damage or destruction of other property belonging to migrant 
traders, including homes and cars; (h) temporary or permanent forced dis-
placement of migrant entrepreneurs and their families; and (i) extortion for 
protection by local leaders, police and residents. Looting of store goods and 
damage to the stores were easily the most common types of action recorded.
While xenophobic views and actions are not espoused or approved of 
by all local residents of affected settlements, their prevalence suggests that 
they do enjoy sufficient support and that there are few deterrents. Far from 
reducing xenophobia, claims that collective violence against migrant busi-
nesses are simply acts of criminality legitimize and may even incite further 
violence. There is also the prejudiced, xenophobic idea that non-citizens 
are not entitled to anything – not police protection and certainly not to 
run a small business, even if it is enshrined in law and generated through 
their own initiative. The bigger picture, which includes the threat to all 
small-scale traders posed by supermarkets’ increasing dominance, is lost as 
the focus turns to curtailing migrant entrepreneurship in place of the real, 
urgent need to support opportunities for all small entrepreneurs in marginal 
settlements through incentives and programmes. 
This report focuses on the chronology and geography of collective vio-
lence against migrant entrepreneurs since South Africa’s first democratic 
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elections in 1994. The overall aim of the research was to document and 
create a chronological account of attacks on migrant businesses, to cat-
egorise the types and frequency of attacks and to map the locations where 
such events occurred. The incidents discussed involve the intentional and 
spontaneous participation of groups of people in acts of collective violence 
against migrant businesses. Three distinct criteria, singly or in combination, 
were used for including an incident as part of the analysis: first, the scale 
of damage had to be extensive, affecting a number of businesses; second, 
there had to have been displacement of and injuries to business owners; 
and third, the violence had to have been perpetrated by groups rather than 
individuals. The analysis revealed the following about attacks on migrant 
entrepreneurs: 
 7KHUHKDVEHHQDPDUNHGSDWWHUQRIHVFDODWLRQRYHUWLPH3UHLQFL-
dents constitute less than 5% of recorded episodes. A definite upswing 
is seen from 2006 onwards, with the sharpest growth occurring after 
2008. Excluding events in May 2008, nearly 90% of recorded episodes of 
group violence against migrant businesses occurred since the beginning 
of 2008. The five years with the largest number of incidents were from 
2010 to 2014.
 &ROOHFWLYH YLROHQFH WDUJHWLQJPLJUDQW HQWUHSUHQHXUV LV QR ORQJHU FRQ-
fined to a few isolated locations. Since 2005, the majority of South 
African provinces have been touched by such collective violence. 
However, the Western Cape and Gauteng have experienced the highest 
levels of violence. The overall number of affected provinces and locali-
ties has increased considerably since 2005 and the majority of provinces 
have witnessed repeated incidents since 2009. Since 2009, at least 32 
distinct locations have witnessed two or more episodes of group violence.
 7KH VFDOH RI WKH DWWDFNV LV VRPHWLPHV VL]HDEOH DQG FDQ VSLOO RYHU LQWR
neighbouring settlements. Looting and vandalism of migrant-owned 
shops have been especially common features of collective violence. 
These actions, though criminal, may appear less grave when compared 
to severe injuries and loss of lives, but they cannot be treated as incon-
sequential as they impose unwarranted hardships on migrant entrepre-
neurs through partial or complete loss of stock and destruction of their 
shops and investments. 
 &ROOHFWLYH YLROHQFH DJDLQVWPLJUDQW EXVLQHVVHV DOVR LPSDFWV QHJDWLYHO\
on South African citizens and businesses. Wholesalers, retailers and 
suppliers are affected when migrant business activities are disrupted 
or destroyed. Also, a significant proportion of migrant businesses rent 
business spaces from South African property owners, who lose rental 
income when their tenants are expelled or their premises are vandalized. 
Other losers include poor local consumers who are forced to buy more 
expensive goods from larger stores or face the inconvenience of travel-
ling longer distances to purchase necessities. 
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The opinions of politicians and officials about migrant entrepreneurs 
often seem indistinguishable from the intolerant views of ordinary citizens 
and this, in turn, reinforces negative beliefs and ideas in the populace at 
large. Their excusing attacks on migrant entrepreneurs as unrelated to 
xenophobia are contradicted by the details of many of these attacks. What 
makes the official position especially ironic is when officials themselves 
articulate sentiments that reproduce the xenophobic myths that they claim 
do not exist. Failure to curb the situation by consistently restraining offend-
ers and imposing stringent penalties on collective violence only expands the 
elements of “opportunism” attached to such acts, encouraging others to par-
ticipate, and reinforcing the unprotected position of migrants and refugees 
as “outsiders” in affected areas.
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“Are we so despised that because I sell a loaf of bread a little cheaper 
than my competitor I must be punished for it with my life?”.1
introduCtion
International migrants are often lauded for their enterprise, innovation and business acumen.2 However, it is clear that these “unsung heroes” face 
formidable obstacles in successfully establishing and growing an enterprise 
in a new country of settlement.3 Common economic and social challenges 
confronting small-scale immigrant entrepreneurs from the Global South 
include limited market information, low levels of personal liquidity, poor 
access to credit and startup capital, high transaction costs, gender discrimi-
nation, over-regulation and intense competition.4 The national and local 
policy environment within which immigrant businesses operate also plays 
a critical role in determining business failure or success. The environment 
includes legal restrictions and obligations, attitudes and policies towards 
migrant business activity, immigration and refugee legislation, and policing 
practices. As one study of immigrant entrepreneurial behaviour notes, “the 
effects of the regulatory environment are transmitted through a broad range 
of state activities, including through the knock-on effect of immigration 
laws, which may not have had an intended influence”.5 
While some attention has been given to the economic and policy envi-
ronment in explaining variations in business performance among immigrant 
entrepreneurs, much less has been paid to how the negative reactions of 
citizens to their activities and presence in the country might impact on 
entrepreneurship.6 South Africa provides a particularly important case 
study of how citizen attitudes and behaviours materially affect the business 
climate for migrant entrepreneurs. In August 1997, for example, in the 
midst of “rainbow nation” euphoria following the country’s first democratic 
elections, non-South African street traders were attacked and assaulted on 
the streets of Johannesburg. Many lost their merchandise and stands, some 
at gunpoint. The violence and intimidation were “accompanied by angry 
and vitriolic anti-immigrant rhetoric”.7 This incident, largely overlooked by 
the state, emboldened a pattern of hostility towards migrant entrepreneurs 
that has reached epidemic proportions over the last decade. 
Sometimes lost in the sobering statistics about the anti-immigrant 
violence that swept South Africa in May 2008 (over 70 people dead, 400 
seriously injured, and 100,000 internally displaced) is the fact that many 
migrant-owned businesses were caught up in the mayhem.8 Looting, burn-
ing and destruction of business property was widespread in the affected areas 
and many migrant entrepreneurs were among those hounded out of their 
communities. Such actions did not die out after May 2008. If anything, as 
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this report demonstrates, they have become more insidious and pervasive, 
and are certainly not confined to the areas that erupted in 2008. 
The remarkable growth of informal migrant entrepreneurship in South 
Africa since 1990, its innovative strategies, and the kinship, ethnic and 
business networks through which goods are acquired and resources accumu-
lated, would have been much lauded had it not been for the striking detail 
that the actors in question are “foreigners” or “outsiders”. As such, they are 
seen as undesirable and disadvantaging poor South African citizens with 
meagre avenues for income generation and survival. The growing presence 
of migrants in the informal sector has created noticeable tension in various 
quarters in South Africa, including government circles, ignoring the fact 
that in the free market economy of South Africa, immigrants and refugees, 
like citizens and commercial enterprises, enjoy the freedom to establish, 
operate and expand their businesses.9 
Successive national attitudinal surveys by SAMP since 1996, as well as 
in-depth qualitative research and the personal testimony of many migrants, 
leave little doubt that South Africans hold deep-rooted negative opinions 
about migrants and refugees in general and migrant entrepreneurs in par-
ticular.10 In the face of this body of evidence, recurrent denials by prominent 
political figures that xenophobia exists ring especially hollow.11 Migrants 
and refugees interfacing with state institutions in various sectors report 
that these interactions are infused with attitudes and rhetoric that question 
their right to be in the country and regularly lead to the denial of services 
to which they are entitled by law and the constitution. Furthermore, when 
the majority of South Africans in national opinion surveys believe that refu-
gees and migrants should not be entitled to legal and police protection, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that only the most egregious cases of police brutality 
garner public sympathy and attention – and even then only because they 
happen to be caught on video.
The first part of this report presents the results of SAMP’s most recent 
survey of South African attitudes towards migrants and refugees on the link-
ages between negative attitudes and hostile behaviours. In other words, how 
willing are South Africans to actually do something about the perceived 
“threat” of migrants and what measures are they willing to take? This analy-
sis provides the context for understanding the problems confronting migrant 
entrepreneurs. The second section describes and analyses the nature of what 
we call “extreme xenophobia”; that is, the prevalence of physical violence 
against migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa.12 This report focuses on the 
frequency and incidence of collective xenophobic violence, its impact on 
migrant entrepreneurship and the evasions of the authorities. 
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a danGerous Climate
Being perceived as a ‘foreigner’ in post-apartheid South Africa (particu-larly if one is from another African country) is inherently dangerous, 
so pervasive is the feeling amongst ordinary South Africans that you do 
not belong and should “go home”.13 Trying to run a business in the South 
African informal economy is an especially hazardous undertaking as there 
is a widespread perception that migrant entrepreneurial activities inevitably 
disadvantage South Africans. This perception has been acted on in four 
main ways. First, the state (both central and municipal) has adopted a “pro-
tectionist” position, which leads to various regulatory and policing responses 
that seek to disadvantage, if not entirely eliminate, migrant entrepreneur-
ship.14 Second, the police on the streets run their own protection (or non-
harassment) rackets to benefit financially from those able to pay. Third, 
South African competitors, particularly in the spaza sector, have increas-
ingly adopted a strategy of what Charman and Piper call “violent entre-
preneurship”; that is, the use of violence to intimidate and drive migrants 
entrepreneurs out of an area.15 Fourth, a minority of citizens have turned 
hostile attitudes into violent actions by forcibly shutting down migrant-
owned businesses and attacking their owners and employees. Underlying all 
of these responses is a strong xenophobic undertow which is both manifest 
and measurable.
The World Values Survey (an independent global attitudinal survey) has 
consistently shown that South Africans are the least disposed globally to 
migrants coming from other countries to engage in economic activity. The 
most recent survey found that 30% of South Africans want a total prohibi-
tion on foreign migrants who intend to work in South Africa (easily the 
highest figure of any country surveyed) (Table 1). Nearly half (48%) want 
there to be strict limits on entry. Thus, 78% are basically opposed to the idea 
of economic immigration to the country; no other country in the South has 
more than 50%. South Africa (at 16%) also has the lowest proportion of 
people in favour of skills-based immigration to fill gaps in the local job mar-
ket and the lowest number (6%) who favour an open-door policy towards 
economic migration. 
SAMP’s periodic surveys of South African attitudes towards the impacts 
of migration reveal more of the underlying economic hostility towards 
migrants (Table 2). Although there have been changes over time (with 
negative perceptions peaking in 2006), there has been a general growth 
in negativity about the social and economic impacts of migration since 
the 1990s. Between 1999 and 2010, for example, the proportion of South 
Africans who agreed that migrants use up resources increased from 59% to 
63%. Those agreeing that they were responsible for crime increased from 
45% to 55% and those that they bring disease from 24% to 39%. In terms of 
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economic impacts, those agreeing that they deprive South Africans of jobs 
has remained steady at around 60%. The proportion who felt that migrants 
bring skills needed by South Africa plummeted from 58% in 1999 to 34% 
in 2010. Only a quarter agree that migrants actually create jobs for South 
Africans. 
 
Table 1: South African Attitudes To Economic Migrants in Comparative Perspective
Country
Prohibit  
immigration  
(%)
Place strict limits 
on entry  
(%)
Let people in as 
long as jobs are 
available (%)
Let in anyone who 
wants to enter  
(%)
South
South Africa 30 48 16 6
India 23 23 25 30
Ghana 18 39 36 7
Zambia 11 30 44 15
Brazil 11 33 47 9
China 8 21 51 20
Indonesia 6 15 72 8
Thailand 5 16 65 14
Malaysia 2 8 72 18
North
Italy 8 49 37 6
United States 7 37 49 8
Germany 7 43 45 5
Australia 3 54 41 2
Canada 2 39 51 8
Source: World Values Survey
Table 2: South African Perceptions of Impacts of Migration*
1999 (%) 2006 (%) 2010 (%)
Social impacts
Use up resources (e.g. water, electricity, housing) 59 67 63
Commit crime 45 67 55
Bring disease 24 49 39
Economic impacts
Take jobs 56 62 60
Bring needed skills 58 25 34
Create jobs for South Africans – 22 27
*Percentage who agree/strongly agree
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Because migrants in South Africa come from all over the world it is 
important to know if particular opprobrium is reserved for those from cer-
tain areas. In the latest SAMP survey, migrants from other Southern African 
countries had the highest favourability ratings (25% “completely favour-
able”), followed by migrants from Europe and North America (21%) and 
the rest of Africa (17%) (Table 3). Differences therefore exist but they are 
not particularly large and all migrants, wherever they are from, rate much 
lower than South Africans’ evaluations of themselves (65% favourable for 
Black South Africans and 56% favourable for White South Africans). Since 
a significant number of migrants (and migrant entrepreneurs) are refugees, 
it is of interest that only 21% of South Africans have a completely favour-
able impression of refugees. Unsurprisingly, irregular migrants are viewed 
with the most distaste (12% favourable and 49% completely unfavourable).
Table 3: South African Impressions of Migrants and Citizens, 2010
Completely  
favourable (%)
Completely  
unfavourable (%)
South African groups
Blacks 65 5
Whites 56 4
Coloureds 49 7
Indians/Asians 42 12
Migrant groups
Southern Africans 25 21
Europeans/North Americans 21 18
Rest of Africa 17 26
Refugees/asylum-seekers 21 27
Irregular migrants 12 49
South Africans do make clear distinctions between African migrants of 
different nationalities (Table 4). Within the SADC region, migrants from 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are viewed more positively than those 
from Zimbabwe and Mozambique. However, migrants from non-neighbour-
ing countries rate even less positively: Nigerians (59% unfavourable), Con-
golese (51% unfavourable) and Somalis (50% unfavourable). Since many 
informal migrant entrepreneurs are drawn from the ranks of Zimbabweans, 
Mozambicans, Somalis and Congolese, it is not hard to imagine why they 
are singled out for harsh treatment. SAMP also found that levels of xeno-
phobia are highest amongst self-employed South Africans in the informal 
economy.16 Levels are lower amongst both the unemployed and employees 
in the informal economy.
Migrant EntrEprEnEurship, CollECtivE violEnCE and XEnophobia in south afriCa
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Table 4: South African Impressions of Migrants by Country of Origin, 2010
Unfavourable (%) Favourable (%)
Neighbouring countries
Zimbabwe 44 15
Mozambique 40 15
Botswana 24 31
Swaziland 23 33
Lesotho 23 32
Other African countries
Nigeria 59 7
Angola 48 9
DRC 51 9
Somalia 50 9
Ghana 45 11
Simply because the majority of a national population hold negative 
perceptions of a minority group such as migrants, it does not automatically 
follow that violent acts against that group will be pervasive or, indeed, occur 
at all. However, a significant minority of South Africans polled in attitudinal 
surveys have consistently expressed a willingness to take the law into their 
own hands. In 2010, for example, SAMP asked South Africans how likely 
they would be to take part in collective action against migrants (Table 5). As 
many as 23% said it was likely that they would act to stop migrants moving 
into their community, 20% would prevent migrant children enrolling in the 
same schools as their own children, and 15% would prevent migrants from 
becoming co-workers. Important for the argument of this report, 25% said 
they would be likely to stop a migrant from operating a business in their area. 
By dividing respondents into those that lived in ‘hotspots’ in the May 
2008 violence and those in areas that were not, it is possible to ascertain if 
areas with experience of widespread violence are more prone to future vio-
lence.17 While hotspot residents are more likely to prevent migrants from 
operating a business and moving into their community, they are less likely 
to oppose them becoming co-workers or enrolling their children in the same 
schools. However, the differences are not large and one in four residents of 
areas not directly affected by May 2008 said they were likely to take action 
to stop a migrant from operating a business in their community. 
Table 5: Likelihood of South Africans Taking Preventative Action Against Migrants, 2010
How likely are you to take action to prevent 
migrants doing the following: (% Likely/Very likely)
All urban 
areas
2008  
hotspots
2008  
other
From operating a business in your area 25 27 24
From moving into your neighbourhood 23 27 21
From enrolling their children in school 20 18 21
From becoming a co-worker 15 14 21
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Finally, the SAMP survey asked South Africans how likely they would be 
to take certain actions against people they suspected were irregular migrants 
in their community. Since South Africans believe that the vast majority 
of foreign migrants are in the country illegally, this is not very different to 
asking what they would do about migrants in general. Around a third said 
they would report them to the police, to employers or to community lead-
ers (Table 6). Fewer (15%) said they would combine with others to eject 
them from the community and 11% said they were prepared to use violence 
against the migrants. The predilection to use violence was actually slightly 
stronger in areas not affected by the attacks of May 2008. What this means 
is that around one in every ten South Africans is predisposed to turn hostile 
attitudes into violent actions. This may seem a relatively low proportion in 
light of the prevalence of negative attitudes but multiplied it does suggest 
that 3.8 million (out of an adult population of around 35 million) South 
Africans would be prepared to use violent means to rid their neighbour-
hoods of foreign migrants. 
Table 6: Likelihood of Taking Punitive Action Against Irregular Migrants, 2010
How likely are you to take action against irregular 
migrants in your area: (% Likely/Very likely)
All urban 
areas
2008 hotspots 2008 other
Report them to police 36 34 36
Report them to employer 27 26 28
Report them to community association 27 24 29
Combine to force them to leave 15 15 15
Use violence against them 11 9 11
methodoloGy
There has been no systematic longitudinal analysis of the nature, distri-bution and intensity of violent incidents targeting migrants and refu-
gees. Official statistics are not maintained and the tendency of government 
representatives and senior politicians to classify violent attacks on migrants 
and migrant businesses as “opportunistic crime” has only deepened the 
uncertainty about the occurrence of xenophobic violence in the country 
and its underlying causes.18 This report draws on the evidence from an 
extensive archive of news articles from various media sources collected 
by SAMP since 1994 and detailed timeline reconstructions already in the 
public domain.19 The overall aim of the research was to create a chrono-
logical account of attacks on migrant businesses, to categorise the types and 
frequency of attacks and to map the locations where such events occurred. 
Several qualifications are in order. First, research on hate crimes in other 
contexts confirms that a sizeable proportion of such episodes go unreported 
and unrecorded.20 The inventory on which this paper is based does not 
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claim to be exhaustive since many incidents undoubtedly go unreported 
by the press or human rights groups. Second, the lack of confidence in law 
enforcement agencies, poor prosecution of offenders, weak deterrent meas-
ures for xenophobic violence, as well as the continued presence of offenders 
in localized settings, are all likely to discourage migrants from reporting to 
the authorities.21 Third, the information in the database tends to be descrip-
tive in nature, describing but not explaining why attacks take place or why 
they take the particular form that they do. 
Although there is plenty of evidence of violent attacks on individual 
migrant entrepreneurs, this paper focuses on acts of collective or group 
violence. Collective violence has been defined as the “instrumental use of 
violence by persons who define themselves as members of a group against 
another group in order to achieve political, social or economic objectives”.22 
Aggressive social interaction organized on a group basis is the key feature 
here, whether this group or collective identity is assumed and transitory or 
has a permanent and stable character. This form of episodic social interac-
tion involves perpetrators who distinguish themselves from the targeted 
victims either subliminally or directly. Moreover, this contact directly inflicts 
physical damage on the targeted persons and/or their possessions with some 
level of coordination and synchronization amongst the perpetrators, even in 
incidents that appear spontaneous with low levels of organization.23 There 
are obviously different varieties of collective violence, varying in scope, 
duration and degree of organization. The damage caused by such violence 
also varies in scale and gravity with some acts having far-reaching and 
deadly consequences, such as those that swept South Africa in May 2008.24 
Collective violence has also been defined as a type of social control in 
which grievances and perceived wrongs are handled through unilateral 
aggression.25 The collectivization of violence generally occurs where there 
is strong partisanship and additional individuals support one side against the 
other. Solidarity is skewed in favour of the perpetrators and distanced from 
the targets of violence.26 A high frequency of collective violence is an indi-
cator of profound social and cultural distance between the groups involved 
(the perpetrators and their intended targets). Other localized factors such 
as low institutional confidence, weak policing, and areas with long histories 
of violent crime, buttress a social environment where the likelihood and 
opportunities for collective violence remain robust.27 Institutional barri-
ers to protection and justice for the victims activate and perpetuate the 
violence. 
The incidents discussed in this paper involve the intentional and sponta-
neous participation of groups of people in acts of collective violence against 
migrant businesses. The SAMP database contains information on over 250 
separate incidents of collective violence since 1994. Migrant entrepreneurs 
and their businesses were also severely affected during the large-scale vio-
lence that occurred in May 2008. However, the events of that month are 
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excluded from this assessment since they have been examined in depth 
elsewhere and are often treated as an exceptionally large singular event, 
even though there were at least 100 (and perhaps as many as 150) localized 
incidents of collective violence.28 The assessment is based on the identifica-
tion and analysis of the largest or most significant episodes occurring since 
1994. Three distinct criteria, singly or in combination, were used for inclu-
sion: first, the scale of damage had to be extensive, affecting a number of 
businesses; second, there had to have been displacement of and injuries to 
business owners; and third, the violence had to have been perpetrated by 
groups rather than individuals.
ColleCtive violenCe aGainst miGrant entrePreneurs
ChronoloGy of ColleCtive violenCe
From 1994 to August 2014 (excluding May 2008), there were at least 250 documented episodes of group-based violence against migrants and 
refugee businesses in various locations around the country. The actual tally 
is likely to be even higher since not all events reach the attention of the 
media and monitoring organizations. An analysis of the frequency of col-
lective violence reveals a marked pattern of escalation over time (Table 7). 
Table 7: Frequency of Collective Violence 
Year No. of incidents Percentage 
Pre-2005 9 4
2005 4 2
2006 9 4
2007 9 4
2008* 19 8
2009 17 7
2010 46 20
2011 22 10
2012 25 11
2013 36 16
2014 (to end-August) 32 14
Total 228 100
* Excluding May 2008 attacks
Pre-2005 incidents constitute less than 5% of recorded episodes. A defi-
nite upswing is seen from 2006 onwards, with the sharpest growth occurring 
after 2008. Excluding events in May 2008, nearly 90% of recorded episodes 
of group violence against migrant businesses occurred since the beginning 
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of 2008. The five years with the largest number of incidents were from 
2010 to 2014. The highest annual number (20% of the total) was recorded 
in 2010 during an upsurge in xenophobic attacks after the World Cup was 
held in South Africa. While these episodes differed in terms of the number 
of affected migrants and the severity of the damage, it is evident that small-
scale, informal migrant businesses occupy a highly precarious position in 
South African settlements, having become especially vulnerable to situa-
tions of collective violence. 
GeoGraPhies of ColleCtive violenCe
Collective violence targeting migrant entrepreneurs is no longer confined to 
a few isolated locations. Since 2005, the majority of South African provinces 
have been touched by collective violence against migrant businesses. How-
ever, the Western Cape and Gauteng have experienced the highest levels 
of violence. The overall number of affected provinces and localities has 
increased considerably since 2005; indeed, the majority of provinces have 
witnessed repeated incidents since 2009. In 2005-2006, incidents occurred 
in six distinct locations within three provinces (Figure 1). In 2009-2010, 
they occurred in at least 14 separate locations extending over six of the nine 
provinces in South Africa (Figures 2 to 4). The year 2010 stands out with at 
least 37 separate locations situated in six provinces. The number of affected 
areas may have fallen somewhat to 22 in 2012 and 27 in 2013, but the num-
ber of affected provinces still stood at 6 and 7 respectively (Figures 5 to 7). 
Several of the affected locations have witnessed repeated rounds of col-
lective violence. Diepsloot, for example, was affected in 2006, and again 
in 2009, 2010 and 2013.29 Other areas have experienced several incidents 
with short intervals between them. In the town of Delmas in Mpumalanga, 
for example, migrant businesses were assailed in February 2013 and again 
in April that year. In Mamelodi, migrant businesses were attacked in June 
2014 and again in September. Since 2009, at least 32 distinct locations have 
witnessed two or more episodes of group violence (Table 8). Of these, col-
lective violence has been repeated on three or more occasions in 12 areas: 
Delmas, Diepsloot, Duduza, Gugulethu, Khayelitsha, KwaNobuhle, Langa, 
Mamelodi, Motherwell, Orange Farm, Ramaphosa and Soweto. Some of 
these locations, such as Ramaphosa township, also witnessed extensive vio-
lence and destruction during May 2008.30
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Table 8: Collective Violence Locations, 2009–2014
Locations Province
Booysens Park, KwaDesi, KwaNobuhle, Kugya, Motherwell, Port Elizabeth Eastern Cape
Bothaville, Botshabelo, Deneysville, Fouriesburg, Koppies, Kroonstad, Maokeng, 
Odendaalsrus, Sasolburg, Thabong, Viljoenskroon, Welkom, Zamdela
Free State
Atteridgeville, Benoni, Boipatong, Diepsloot, Duduza, Ekurhuleni, Evaton, Foch-
ville, Freedom Park, Ga-Rankuwa, Imbeliseni, Johannesburg, Kya Sands, Lake-
side, Mamelodi, Mayfair, Orange Farm, Protea, Ramaphosa, Ratanda, Sebo-
keng, Sharpeville, Soshanguve, Soweto, Tembisa, Thokoza, Tsakane 
Gauteng
Giyani, Marapong, Phagemeng, Lebowakgomo, Lephalale Limpopo
Botshabelo, Delmas, Emjindini, Leandra, Mhluzi, Sakhile, Siyathemba Mpumalanga
Barkly West Northern Cape
Boitekong, Boitumelong, Rustenburg, Setlagole North West
Bishop Lavis, Bloekombos, Botrivier, Cape Town, Delft, Du Noon, Franschhoek, 
Freedom Park, Grabouw, Gugulethu, Harare, Khayelitsha, Klapmuts, Langa, 
Malmesbury, Mbekweni, Mitchells Plain, Moorreesburg, Nyanga, Paarl East, 
Philippi, Riviersonderend, Samora Machel, Silverton, Valhalla Park, Wellington, 
Wolseley, Worcester
Western Cape
Figure 1: Collective Violence Locations, South Africa 2005–2006
Polokwane
Giyani
Marapong
Mbombela
(Nelspruit)
Pretoria
0D¿NHQJ
eMalahleni
(Witbank)
Kimberley
Upington
Ladysmith
Johannesburg
Krugersdorp
Germiston
Queenstown
East London
Bhisho
Grahamstown
Uitenhage
Durban
Pietermaritzburg
George
Richards Bay
Paarl
Worcester
StellenboschCape Town 3
Deneysville
Koppies
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
LESOTHO
SWAZI-
LAND
MOZAM-
BIQUE
ZIMBABWE
Welkom
Viljoenskroon
Zamdela
Leanara
Rustenburg
Setlagole
Boitekong
Emjindini
Phagenmeng
(Modimolle)
Bothaville
Kugya
Barkly West
Sasolburg
1
2
4
Thabong Fouriesburg
Port Elizabeth
Knysna
Masiphumelele
Cape Flats
Botshabelo
Balfour/Siyathemba
Delmas
Sakhile
Diepsloot
5
6
KroonstadSishen
Hotazel
Bethlehem
Bohlokong
Newcastle
Piet Retief
Klerksdorp
Bloemfontein
NORTHERN CAPE
NORTH WEST
NORTHERN 
PROVINCE
MPUMALANGA
KWAZULU-NATAL
GAUTENG
FREE STATE
WESTERN CAPE
EASTERN CAPE
Migrant EntrEprEnEurship, CollECtivE violEnCE and XEnophobia in south afriCa
 16
Figure 2: Collective Violence Locations, South Africa 2009–2010
Figure 3: Collective Violence Locations, Gauteng 2009–2010
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Figure 4: Collective Violence Locations, Western Cape 2009–2010
Figure 5: Collective Violence Locations, South Africa 2012–2013
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Figure 6: Collective Violence Locations, Gauteng 2012–2013
Figure 7: Collective Violence Locations, Western Cape 2012–2013
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Figure 1: South Africa 2005–2006
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Figure 2: South Africa 2009–2010
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Figure 5: South Africa 2012–2013
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Figure 6: Gauteng 2012-2013
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tyPoloGies of ColleCtive violenCe
The nationwide attacks on migrants and refugees in May 2008 represent 
the nadir of xenophobic hostility in South Africa. There is an obvious 
temptation to characterize other, prior and subsequent, episodes of collec-
tive violence as “minor” incidents. Such a conclusion would be profoundly 
misplaced. The cumulative impact of months, indeed years, of low-level 
verbal and physical warfare against migrant entrepreneurs has taken a major 
toll on the lives and livelihoods of some of South Africa’s most enterpris-
ing residents. Belligerent, discriminatory and abusive types of action have 
occurred. They include (a) written or verbal threats and insults directed 
at migrant entrepreneurs; (b) public intimidation of migrant entrepreneurs 
through protests or marches or other similar collective actions; (c) invol-
untary migrant shop closures; (d) direct physical violence against migrant 
store owners or their employees; (e) looting of store contents; (f) damage 
to the physical structure of shops, especially through arson; (g) damage or 
destruction of other property belonging to migrant traders, including homes 
and cars; (h) temporary or permanent forced displacement of migrant entre-
preneurs and their families; and (i) extortion for protection by local leaders, 
police and residents. Looting of store goods and damage to stores were easily 
the most common types of action recorded. 
A number of incidents are worth recalling to illustrate the nature and 
intensity of collective violence after 2008. Between mid-2009 and late 2010, 
for example, more than 20 migrants were killed and another 40 received 
serious injuries in various attacks.31 Of these, at least four people were 
killed during a series of violent confrontations over the presence of migrant 
traders in the Freedom Park township of Gauteng.32 In mid-2011, 52 shops 
were plundered and three burnt down in Motherwell and three shops looted 
and one burnt down in KwaDesi.33 In 2012, more than 700 shops were 
looted and/or destroyed and over 500 migrants were displaced because of 
public violence in Botshabelo in the Free State province.34 That same year, 
two Bangladeshi traders (described as Pakistani citizens in some accounts) 
suffered third-degree burns and later died after a group of assailants threw 
a petrol-bomb on their container store in Thokoza and blocked the store’s 
entrance preventing their escape.35 Three shops were then petrol-bombed 
during large-scale looting of Somali-owned businesses in the Valhalla Park 
area of Cape Town.36 
During a particularly volatile period in Port Elizabeth in mid-2013, there 
was extensive vandalism, arson and plundering of an estimated 150 spaza 
shops operated by migrants and refugees.37 One Somali refugee, Abdi Nasir 
Mahmoud Good, was publicly stoned to death while attempting to salvage 
his belongings from his ransacked store. Video footage was later released 
on YouTube showing the perpetrators, some of whom were children in 
school uniforms. Also in 2013, more than 200 migrant shopkeepers oper-
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ating small-scale businesses in the town of Delmas, east of Johannesburg, 
were forced to close their stores after a spate of attacks. Four spaza shops 
were bombed in Mitchells Plain after their migrant owners refused to pay 
protection money.38 In a bout of violence over six days in June 2014, two 
refugees were killed when nearly 100 migrant businesses were looted or 
torched in Mamelodi East outside Pretoria.39 The violence was repeated in 
the Phomolong area of Pretoria two months later when three people were 
killed and several others wounded during a rampage that lasted for three 
weeks.40 Finally, before the army was called in to contain the unrest, a 
Somali trader was killed and three stores were torched when migrant traders 
were attacked during post-election violence in Alexandra township in mid-
2014.41 As these examples of collective violence demonstrate, the scale of 
the attacks is sometimes sizeable and can spill over into neighbouring settle-
ments. Looting and vandalism of migrant-owned shops have been especially 
common features of collective violence over the past several years. These 
actions, though criminal, may appear less grave when compared to severe 
injuries and loss of lives, but they cannot be treated as inconsequential as 
they impose unwarranted hardships on migrant entrepreneurs through par-
tial or complete loss of stock and destruction of their shops and investments. 
The vulnerability of migrant shopkeepers has exposed them to other 
invidious forms of exploitation. Some 80 migrant traders operating from 
Extensions 8 to 12 in Diepsloot settlement north of Johannesburg, for exam-
ple, were coerced into providing payment as “protection money” to local 
residents to avoid damages to and pillaging of their stores during service 
delivery protests.42 A Johannesburg High Court order, in response to an 
urgent petition on xenophobic violence in Duduza and surrounding town-
ships of the Ekurhuleni municipality, acknowledged the culpability of a ward 
councillor in instigating acts of violence against Somali, Bangladeshi and 
Ethiopian migrant traders.43 Migrants claimed that he stoked xenophobia 
and then solicited bribes in exchange for their safety. 
Collective violence against migrant businesses not only shatters liveli-
hoods of the targeted migrant groups, it impacts on South African citizens 
and businesses. Wholesalers, retailers and suppliers are inevitably affected 
when migrant business activities are disrupted or destroyed. Also, a sig-
nificant proportion of migrant businesses rent business spaces from South 
African property owners, who lose rental income when their tenants are 
expelled or their premises are vandalized.44 In addition, extensive damage 
to store structures degrades the existing and often meagre assets of local 
property owners. Other losers include poor local consumers who are forced 
to buy more expensive goods from larger stores or face the inconvenience of 
travelling longer distances to purchase necessities. 
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PreCiPitants of violenCe
It is not easy to tease out and identify intentions, motivations and under-
lying causes in turbulent situations, especially when relying on reportage 
and monitoring. Scholars researching collective violence have commonly 
expressed this dilemma.45 Some things are, however, evident. Some of the 
violence perpetrated against migrant businesses is obviously motivated only 
or primarily by criminal behaviour, especially robberies and looting, but 
to attribute all attacks to criminal motivation (as the state seeks to do) is 
completely reductionist and misleading. In general, the weak structural and 
social position of “foreigners” in localized areas as “outsiders”, combined 
with limited access to protection and justice, certainly makes them more 
vulnerable to criminal attack. In other words, the attackers may not them-
selves be always motivated by xenophobia but it is xenophobia that makes 
their targets easy prey. 
While the precipitants (or triggers) for any particular incident of col-
lective violence vary, there is a clear general pattern both in terms of the 
choice of targets and the selective directing of violence toward migrants 
and migrant businesses. Local business competitors have certainly animated 
some of the collective violence against migrant entrepreneurs.46 A distinc-
tive feature is the recent emergence and incendiary stance of loosely-formed 
groups, purportedly representing many or all South African small-business 
owners. These groups range from localized structures like the Zanokhanyo 
Retailers’ Association operating in townships, settlements and urban areas 
such as Khayelitsha, to larger regional forums like the innocuously-named 
Greater Gauteng Business Forum. Since 2008, these groups have engaged in 
numerous public hate campaigns against migrant businesses, liberally using 
belligerent tactics ranging from forced store closures, coerced price increas-
es, limits on the number of migrant businesses in an area, and public threats 
through letters or by radio. A few months after the May 2008 violence, for 
example, many Somali shopkeepers in Khayelitsha received threatening 
hand-delivered letters from the Zanokhanyo Retailers’ Association ordering 
them to cease operating their stores.47 In late 2010, the association again 
used intimidatory tactics to shut down Somali-owned shops in Khayelitsha, 
claiming that the terms of an agreement reached with Somali shopkeepers 
limiting the number of migrant businesses in the area were being violated.48 
The Middelburg Small Business Community Forum claimed credit for mobi-
lizing local authorities after the Steve Tshwete Municipality shut down 50 
Somali shops and refused to issue them with trading licences.49 Accusing 
them of unfair competition and rising crime, the local forum stoked group 
violence against migrant-run shops in Lephalale in Limpopo in 2013 in the 
course of which five shops, two houses and three vehicles were razed.50 
By early 2011, the Greater Gauteng Business Forum had become a very 
visible presence through its intimidation of migrant traders in the prov-
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ince of Gauteng. There are reports of the forum’s direct involvement in 
campaigns to expel migrant businesses from locations such as Kathlehong, 
Soweto, Eldorado Park, Ramaphosa, Mamelodi and Diepsloot. The forum 
chairperson claimed that campaigns against “foreign traders” were “strictly 
business” and have “nothing to do with xenophobia or politics”, but the 
overt reasoning to justify these group actions draws from a familiar reservoir 
of xenophobic beliefs and a wilful misunderstanding of the rights of migrants 
and refugees in South Africa.51 Distorted ideas about migrants’ presence 
and their impacts on South Africa are used to justify collective mobilization 
and violence against migrant businesses. For example, the Greater Gauteng 
Business Forum is reported to have stated that “these people are molest-
ing our economy”.52 Forum members and other local business groups have 
expressed similar discriminatory sentiments: “We feel that foreigners who 
entered the country illegally or don’t have a business licence to run spaza 
shops should leave because they are destroying our small local businesses 
and exploiting our people”.53 In 2013, the forum reiterated its central argu-
ment by maintaining that all migrant entrepreneurs must “go back home” 
because they are “here to destroy local business and people” asserting, as 
well, that “if nothing is done about it, there will be war”.54
The forceful targeting of migrant businesses, particularly spaza shops, 
has been a common feature of anti-government service-delivery protests in 
various parts of the country. In 2014, for example, one-third of the violent 
incidents involving looting and vandalism of migrant-owned shops took 
place during local anti-government or anti-municipality protests. Dissat-
isfaction over the pace of road construction and employment of locals for 
infrastructure projects in Sebokeng, for example, led to efforts to forcibly 
oust migrant businesses.55 Agitating for a better water supply, Hebron 
residents in North West province looted at least six shops in February 2014 
after police cracked down on protesters. The connections between local 
dissatisfaction and resentment over service issues and attacks on migrant-
owned shops need greater explanation. One hypothesis advanced by Abdul 
Hasan of the Somali Association of South Africa is that “they are targeting 
foreigners because we are the weaker link in the community, so they hit us 
to get government attention”.56 
On several occasions, other kinds of protests have spiralled into xeno-
phobic attacks on migrant businesses.57 More than 100 shops of Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi migrants were attacked over several days in early 2012 
in Welkom, Odendaalsrus and Thabong, for example, when local youths 
went on a rampage after discussions over enhanced quotas for hiring South 
Africans on local mines stalled.58 In 2013, an estimated 200 businesses were 
damaged and plundered in Zamdela and neighbouring Deneysville and 
Koppies in Sasolburg during violent agitation rejecting the amalgamation of 
municipalities.59 Allegations of dumped ballot boxes, election rigging and 
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discontent over the outcome-generated post-election unrest in Alexan-
dra in 2014 took a swift xenophobic turn when migrant shopkeepers were 
viciously targeted.60 Also in 2014, an unresolved labour dispute between the 
South African Municipal Workers’ Union and the Metsimaholo Municipal-
ity of Free State prompted the violent public raiding of migrant businesses 
in Zamdela and neighbouring settlements of France and Armelia outside 
Sasolburg.61 
Participants in collective violence may not always use xenophobic 
language while attacking migrant stores, but an underlying xenophobic 
rationale is often there. Migrant entrepreneurs invariably characterize the 
general attitudes of the local community towards them in this way. Seven 
shops owned by Pakistani migrants were wrecked and ransacked in Boipa-
tong during the course of an anti-government protest in February 2010, 
for example. The migrants themselves described the attacks as “hateful” 
and some participants defended their actions by arguing that “foreigners 
don’t support our protests, and they are living a better life than us here in 
our country”.62 Zamdela township’s residents said that migrant businesses 
were targeted in early 2013 during a violent protest against the merger of 
Metsimaholo municipality in Sasolburg with the Ngwathe municipality near 
Parys because they did not “assist” the local community.63 In Duduza, local 
residents justified their collective, aggressive attacks on 200 migrant-owned 
shops in late 2013 as follows: “They come here and steal our jobs and now 
they are killing our children. We cannot accept this.”64 
In other instances, there were direct triggers linked to the presence of 
migrants. A Somali shopkeeper was killed and all Somali traders had to 
evacuate Booysen Park in 2013 when local residents associated them with 
criminal gangs and attacked them.65 Amandla Wethu Workers’ Union 
members assailed many Bangladeshi, Chinese, and Pakistani-owned busi-
nesses in Mthatha in the Eastern Cape after their president claimed that 
South African employees were being poorly remunerated.66 Some of the 
largest episodes of group violence have involved retaliatory vigilantism 
in response to the acts of one or two migrants. Instead of confining their 
response to the perpetrators, the vigilantes strike out at many or all persons 
of the same nationality or ethnicity as the migrant offenders, or even at all 
“foreigners” in the area. After a migrant shop owner in Cullinan, east of 
Pretoria, allegedly assaulted a child for stealing from his store, for example, 
local residents looted many shops owned by migrants and refugees and burnt 
three of their vehicles.67 Some 400 residents of Riviersonderend struck out 
at all Somali-owned shops in the area after a South African resident last 
seen in the company of Somalis was found dead. After a migrant shopkeeper 
reportedly shot a local youth for stealing from his store in Jeffreys Bay in 
early 2008, all Somali traders were attacked and forcibly ousted from the 
town.68 In 2013, in Duduza on the East Rand, after an altercation over a 
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cellphone airtime voucher between a Somali shop owner and a local youth, 
who was shot, some 200 stores belonging to Somali, Ethiopian, Eritrean 
and Bangladeshi migrants were stripped of their contents and several struc-
tures were incinerated.69 In Lebokwagamo near Polokwane in April 2011, 
residents attacked all migrants from Ethiopia living in the area, looting and 
damaging their homes and businesses after one of their compatriots was 
accused of raping a girl.70 
While xenophobic views and actions are not espoused or approved of 
by all local residents of affected settlements, their prevalence suggests that 
they do enjoy sufficient support and that there are few deterrents. Support 
from local community leaders also conveys a sense of legitimation and impu-
nity, reducing the inhibition of potential offenders and, at the same time, 
enhancing the “opportunistic” aspects of the violence. Even official toler-
ance and passivity convey ambiguous messages that are only likely to per-
petuate and shore up repeated cycles of violence. In several cases, affected 
traders hit by such attacks have shifted to another settlement only to end up 
facing attacks there too. In a general sense, this rhythmic configuration of 
collective, public violence is only likely to preserve and reinforce the social 
distance between South Africans and “foreigners”. Mutual distrust and sus-
picion between groups is an inevitable outcome of a polarized context where 
xenophobic sentiments and practices are commonplace. Negative attitudes 
about South Africans expressed by migrants and refugees are merely another 
expression of the high degree of detachment between groups in these com-
munities.
offiCial evasions
In a stance that has now become almost customary, South African politi-cians and senior officials at national, provincial and municipal levels are 
quick to label collective violence against migrants and refugees as “oppor-
tunistic crimes”, committed by “criminal elements” or “hardened criminals”, 
while simultaneously repudiating the role of anti-foreigner prejudice.71 At 
national level, individual Ministers and the Cabinet as a whole have repeat-
edly warned against viewing attacks on migrants and refugees as evidence 
of xenophobia. President Zuma recently informed South African MPs that 
xenophobia was not “such a huge problem in South Africa”.72 Justice Min-
ister Jeff Radebe made a similar observation in Parliament when some 80 
stores and businesses owned by migrants were looted in Diepsloot: “The 
criminal activities that are perpetuated by some South Africans are not 
a reflection of xenophobic attacks against foreigners.”73 A South African 
Police Services (SAPS) spokesperson insisted that “when we see children 
looting shops and people robbing people of their goods, it is to us a blatant 
sign of crime that is being excused as xenophobia”.74
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The South African government recently took the unusual step of chal-
lenging Al Jazeera’s online coverage of the stoning to death of a Somali 
refugee and other violence against migrants and refugees in Port Eliza-
beth.75 Government spokesperson Phumla Williams insisted that the article 
“painted an incorrect picture of…South Africa” and was “far from reality” 
and continued that “South Africa allows and welcomes foreign nationals” 
and has “strived to build a society based on the values of unity and together-
ness”.76 With this came the standard denial of the presence of xenophobia 
in South Africa: “The looting, displacement and killing of foreign nationals 
in South Africa should not be viewed as xenophobic attacks, but opportunistic 
criminal acts [emphasis ours] that have the potential to undermine the unity 
and cohesiveness of our communities.”77 
Similarly, at provincial level, the Gauteng government was quick to 
condemn the “brutal and senseless attack” on two Bangladeshi traders in 
Thokoza in 2012 and urged South Africans “to refrain from branding this 
attack as having been motivated by xenophobia [emphasis ours]”.78 After more 
than 100 complaints of looting and vandalism of migrant shops were regis-
tered in 2013 in various parts of Gauteng, government spokesperson Wil-
liams underscored the government’s concern over the “so-called xenophobic 
attacks on foreign nationals [emphasis ours]”.79 When large-scale looting 
and attacks on migrant-owned shops occurred in 2013 in Port Elizabeth, 
provincial police characterized “the motive for the attacks on foreign-
owned spaza shops” as “not xenophobic in nature, but a criminal element that 
has seized an opportunity [emphasis ours]”.80 This by-now-familiar argument 
was wheeled out again in early 2014 when violence occurred in Mamelodi 
East and police personnel attributed it to “criminal elements”, denying that 
xenophobia was a factor. 
The attribution of collective violence against migrant entrepreneurs to 
criminals and not in any way as evidence of xenophobia rings extremely hol-
low when the details of many of these attacks are examined. What makes 
the official position especially ironic is when officials themselves articulate 
sentiments that reproduce the xenophobic myths that they claim do not 
exist. A senior official in the Department of Home Affairs, for example, is 
reported to have informed South African MPs that “if you go to Alexandra, 
you go to Sunnyside, you go everywhere, spaza shops, hair salons, everything 
has been taken over by foreign nationals…they displace South Africans 
by making them not competitive”.81 At an official meeting, then National 
Police Commissioner Bheki Cele characterized immigrants and refugees as 
“people who jump borders”, were flooding into the country and destroying 
the livelihoods of South African informal traders: “The spazas…are better 
stocked than Shoprite. Our people have been economically displaced. All 
these spaza shops [in the townships] are not run by locals…One day our 
people will revolt, and we’ve appealed to the Department of Trade and 
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Industry to do something about it.”82 Former Deputy DTI Minister Eliza-
beth Thabethe made similarly provocative statements about the supposed 
negative effects of Somali entrepreneurs in late 2013 at a national confer-
ence on small, medium and micro enterprises: “You still find many spazas 
with African names, but when you go in to buy, you find your Mohammeds 
and most of them are not even registered”.83
More recently, ANC Secretary-General Gwede Mantashe declared that 
the South African government was concerned about South African small 
businesses that were closing, having been “swallowed by foreign migrants” 
who “did not pay tax and comply with certain laws”.84 He informed an elec-
tion campaign rally at Eldorado Park South in Johannesburg that, “if you go 
to Soweto, corner shops have been taken over by foreigners. We must do 
something about it”. Responding to a wave of public criticism of his Licens-
ing of Businesses Bill, DTI Minister Rob Davies, defended the Bill as an 
effort to curb illegal imports: 
All kinds of outlets [are] springing up that may well be involved 
in illegal imports and things of that sort…If you are found guilty 
of a number of offences, such as selling counterfeit goods...[and] 
you’ve been involved in illegal imports, found guilty of contraven-
ing the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics, and Disinfectants Act, been sell-
ing sub-standard products, employing illegal foreigners, or found 
guilty of conducting illegal business from the licensed premises, 
you’ve been doing drug trade or illegal liquor selling or anything of 
the sort...your licence is automatically revoked. So we say, easy in, 
easy out. You do any of those things, we don’t want you.85
The Minister did not mention that existing legislation is more than able 
to deal with illegal imports, the employment of irregular migrants and illicit 
drug and liquor selling. He did not respond to criticisms that he viewed the 
informal economy as a hive of criminality and that the Bill was actually a 
frontal attack on informal business and migrant entrepreneurship.
The opinions of politicians and officials about migrant entrepreneurs 
often seem indistinguishable from the intolerant views of ordinary citizens 
and this, in turn, reinforces negative beliefs and ideas in the populace at 
large. Failure to curb the situation by consistently restraining offenders and 
imposing stringent penalties on collective violence only expands the ele-
ments of “opportunism” attached to such acts, encouraging others to par-
ticipate, and reinforcing the unprotected position of migrants and refugees 
as “outsiders” in affected areas. Thus, photographs in the South African 
media in July 2012 show the Bishop Lavis (Cape Town) police “standing 
and doing nothing” while spaza shops were torched and looted in Valhalla 
Park.86 The Western Cape Minister for Community Safety, Dan Plato, later 
announced in a public statement that the Independent Police Investigative 
Directorate would examine the case and “take necessary action where any 
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negligence or wrongdoing is identified”.87 However, it is not clear if the case 
was actually investigated or disciplinary proceedings carried out against the 
SAPS personnel.88 
Police passivity has been reported by migrants and the media in many 
episodes of violence targeting foreign-owned businesses. As far back as 
2005, for example, some 150 Pakistani entrepreneurs operating spaza shops 
in Pietermaritzburg organized a protest march against the local police 
demanding accountability after a large mob looted goods worth R150,000 
from one of them.89 Refugee shopkeepers from the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Ethiopia and Somalia who were forced out of Zwelethemba 
township near Worcester in the Western Cape in 2008 filed claims in the 
Equality Court in 2009 seeking redress for the unfair discrimination, xeno-
phobia and inadequate protection provided by police officials during this 
violent episode.90 Despite extensive looting and vandalism of Somali shops 
in Motherwell, Port Elizabeth, in 2013, local police said they were unable 
to offer protection.91 Immigrants whose shops and homes were assailed in 
Wallacedene during a housing dispute in mid-2013 maintained that police 
personnel refused to provide assistance, insisting instead that they leave 
South Africa.92 Weak, hostile or indifferent police responses provide strong 
incentives for repetition by reinforcing biases among existing offenders and 
signalling to potential offenders that migrant businesses are easy targets. 
The victimization of migrant businesses through extortion for protection 
has also been reported. A report on policing in Khayelitsha, an area prone 
to regular violence against migrants and refugees, observed that local police 
personnel often demanded bribes from migrant traders and stole items from 
their stores.93 Civil society groups accused the local police of checking 
immigration documents of affected traders instead of shielding them dur-
ing the public violence that erupted in Mamelodi East and West in June 
2014.94 Dissatisfied with the quality and consistency of police protection, 
spaza owners have adopted two main strategies. First, to protect their own 
businesses from attack, they have entered into local agreements with the 
police and South African entrepreneurs that they will support their efforts 
to prevent any new migrant businesses opening in an area. Second, they 
have begun to arm themselves with weapons to defend their stores and 
their lives. Armed clashes between attackers and store owners have become 
increasingly common in recent years. 
While the police are often accused of standing by in situations of collec-
tive violence, they also act against migrant businesses when ordered to do 
so. With the tacit consent of provincial authorities, and without any prior 
warning, local police in Limpopo province undertook an anti-crime cam-
paign called “Operation Hardstick” in 2012, ostensibly to apprehend crimi-
nals and aggressively tackle illicit activities. They sealed some 600 business-
es run by immigrants and refugees, confiscated their trading stock, imposed 
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fines on them for trading without permits and, according to some accounts, 
detained traders as well as subjecting them to verbal xenophobic abuse.95 
Thirty displaced Ethiopians were then forced to flee when the house they 
were staying in was fire-bombed. The exercise was selectively enforced on 
migrant entrepreneurs and did not affect South African businesses in these 
locations. The Supreme Court, in finding against the Limpopo Government 
and for the Somali Association of South Africa, observed that “one is left 
with the uneasy feeling that the stance adopted by the authorities in relation 
to the licensing of spaza shops and tuck-shops was in order to induce foreign 
nationals who were destitute to leave our shores”.96 
Weak or lack of effective punishment for the perpetrators of violence 
sends permissive signals and tacit sanction. People have been arrested in 
various parts of South Africa over the past few years for public violence, 
looting, arson, malicious damage to property, possession of stolen goods and 
for their participation in collective violence targeting migrant businesses. 
But a great many have been released after verbal warnings and very few 
offenders have been indicted or faced harsh prison sentences. For example, 
in 2011, the Germiston Magistrate’s Court released without any penalty 71 
Kathlehong residents arrested for distributing intimidating letters threaten-
ing “drastic action” against migrant-owned businesses.97 Again, 11 people 
were arrested for the death of Somali refugee Nasir Good, but none of the 
offenders was formally charged or faced criminal proceedings. To date, there 
is evidence of the prosecution and conviction of offenders in only two seri-
ous incidents. The first case involved the burglary of three migrant-owned 
businesses in Buhlebesizwe No. 2 village near Kwaggafontein in 2011 for 
which five citizens were sentenced to individual terms of 15 years by a Mpu-
malanga judge.98 In the second case, one of the three accused in the murder 
of an Ethiopian trader, Thomas Ebamo, in 2012 was sentenced to 25 years’ 
imprisonment in what was characterized by the presiding judge as a “savage 
act of xenophobia”.99 A seller of pots and carpets from his car, Ebamo had 
been robbed and dragged to his death after being tied to a vehicle’s rear 
by his neck. However, these convictions and judgments are very much the 
exception and not the norm. 
ConClusion
Some migrant entrepreneurs may enjoy material advantages over ordinary South Africans in settlements where they operate their informal busi-
nesses, trading stalls or spaza shops. However, their status as “foreigners” 
and “outsiders” in South African society makes them markedly vulnerable 
to constant victimization, harassment and violence. More than that, these 
commonplace actions magnify the sense of constant insecurity experienced 
by migrants and refugees, compromising the ability of victims to fully inte-
grate into South African society. The pervasive sense of fear and insecurity 
Migrant EntrEprEnEurship, CollECtivE violEnCE and XEnophobia in south afriCa
 30
and the constant possibility of violence directed at their bodies and proper-
ties is a reality that they have to face on a daily basis in areas where they 
operate their businesses. As one Somali refugee put it, “we came to this 
country as refugees, because Somalia is being torn apart by war, but here 
another war is taking place, one that we don’t understand, but we are the 
targets”.100
The terms of the debate on the rise of migrant entrepreneurship in 
South Africa have been limited and selective, reiterating (both implicitly 
and explicitly) the prejudiced, xenophobic idea that non-citizens are not 
entitled to police protection nor even running a small business, even if it 
is enshrined in law and generated through their own initiative and inven-
tiveness.101 Explaining collective violence through an undue emphasis on 
group rivalries for limited material resources allows the culpability to be 
shifted on to the attacked group, migrants and refugees in this case, thus 
making the victims responsible for their own suffering. Collective violence 
against migrant businesses and migrants at large becomes an inexorable, 
uncontrolled feature of social reality in such a delimited stance, erasing and 
minimizing options for positive change or progressive interventions leading 
to the fuller acceptance of immigrants into South African society, economy 
and polity.102
Equally importantly, when assessments of “economic competition” are 
delimited on a group basis, particularly when the boundaries are drawn 
around nationality, citizenship and other forms of ethnicity, then they are 
rooted in discriminatory normative judgements about the different and une-
qual economic entitlements of citizens and foreigners in South Africa. The 
idea of economic competition itself is defined selectively and incompletely 
here, omitting the very real and stronger challenges to informal entrepre-
neurship posed by large grocery stores or supermarkets.103 It is difficult to 
imagine a scenario where the South African government would endorse or 
impose severe limits on the expansion of large commercial/retail stores in 
townships and poorer settlements on the grounds that they truncate busi-
ness opportunities for small-scale South African entrepreneurs. In terms of 
concrete, practical intervention, the focus turns in a reactionary manner 
to curtailing migrant entrepreneurship in place of the real, urgent need to 
support and enhance opportunities for all small entrepreneurs in marginal 
settlements through new incentives and programmes. 
The official idea that collective violence against migrant-owned shops 
and businesses is best controlled through the imposition of tougher restric-
tions on migrant businesses rather than robust sanctions against perpetra-
tors through hate-crime legislation and other measures is deeply ingrained. 
So, too, is the feeling that there is no need to ease suspicions about “for-
eigners” and their economic activities within the country. A recent ANC 
policy discussion document, for example, incongruously focused on “peace 
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and stability” and recommended that “by-laws need to be strengthened” in 
a manner that meant “non-South Africans should not be allowed to run or 
buy spaza shops or larger businesses”.104 The document further suggested 
that asylum-seekers whose refugee applications had not been finalized 
by the Department of Home Affairs should be ineligible to operate and 
manage such shops, diverging from protections granted to this vulnerable 
group under national and international law. ANC Western Cape Secretary 
Songezo Mjongile endorsed these proposals by contending that the rise of 
migrant entrepreneurship was the underlying cause of friction and collective 
violence in townships and saying it was “unnatural that nearly all shops in 
townships are owned by foreigners. More locals need to participate and need 
to be supported…it creates tension”.105 
Despite providing goods at cheaper prices to poor consumers, in afford-
able quantities and sometimes on credit, the success and resourcefulness 
of migrant entrepreneurs is regularly and often falsely attributed to the use 
of illegitimate practices such as the sale of expired goods and failure to pay 
taxes. Police Commissioner Arno Lamoer admitted to Parliament’s Police 
Portfolio Committee that migrant and refugee entrepreneurs constituted 
the victims in two-thirds of crimes such as robberies committed against 
small businesses in the Western Cape, but held them responsible for operat-
ing shops from homes or containers without trading permits, failing to bank 
their earnings and sleeping in the store premises.106 Similarly, DTI Minister 
Davies’ defence of the Licensing of Businesses Bill argued that its basic pur-
pose was to control illegal imports and trading when most commentators 
have seen it as a frontal attack on migrant entrepreneurship since, amongst 
other things, it requires all migrants to have business permits that cost far 
more than what all but a tiny minority of informal entrepreneurs can afford.
Far from reducing xenophobia in South Africa, claims that collective 
violence against migrant businesses are simply acts of criminality legiti-
mize and may even incite further violence. These acts are both criminal 
and opportunistic, but not in the sense suggested in public and political 
discourses in South Africa. These acts are criminal in that they can be con-
sidered as offences under the South African penal code and undermine the 
rule of law. Using this logic, one may argue that those who have engaged 
in such acts may be considered as “criminals”. South African shop owners 
have certainly engaged long-term, hardened offenders to get rid of their 
“competition” through violence, and it may even be argued that “criminals” 
have committed some of these acts.107 But a strong case can be made that 
not all of those who have engaged in such violence have histories of criminal 
activity. Situations of mayhem and melee may allow some ordinary citizens 
to engage in such actions and the material benefits from participating in 
such violent actions through looting cannot be detached from the analysis. 
Therefore, an element of opportunism is clearly present, which is why some 
observers have called it “opportunistic xenophobia”.108 
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Selective notions about the barriers faced by South African small-scale 
entrepreneurs animate this debate, as do biased ideas about migrants, their 
activities, and false reasons for their success. The deeply-embedded terrain 
of xenophobia further provides the fertile, volatile context in which a range 
of social, political and economic actors (including participants in violent 
attacks, South African traders, local councillors and, in some cases, police) 
have controlled the anxieties associated with the presence of migrants for 
their own narrow, self-serving interests. The escalating pattern of collective 
violence against migrants and their businesses signals the deeply-drawn 
divisions between insiders and outsiders, based on birth, citizenship and 
nationality. This highly repetitive cycle of violence targeting migrant entre-
preneurs underscores the precarious status they and other immigrants hold 
in South African society. 
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